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Abstract: We analyze when economists become top-level “economic policy-makers,” 
focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country’s leader. We present a 
new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, 
finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 
1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more 
highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private 
finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers 
appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services 
background. A leader’s exposure to economics training is also related to 
appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is 
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In Fall 2008, the Democratic candidate for President, Barrack Obama, asked then-
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
Timothy Geithner whether he would consider serving as Treasury Secretary in a future 
administration. According to his autobiography, Geithner pointed out that he lacked the 
necessary political skills. The newly elected President from the “left” party on the 
American political spectrum nevertheless chose the “economist” after the election, and in 
the midst of a financial crisis. The new Treasury Secretary received daily training from 
the President’s Chief of Staff in an attempt to bolster his political skills but never really 
felt comfortable in his political role.1 
 Is this anecdote representative of a broader phenomenon? One set of authors, 
writing more than two decades ago about the rise of economists in governments, argued 
that “the demand for economists rose radically with the sense of crisis,”2 and later work 
notes that governments may appoint economists to top positions when the economy is in 
trouble.3 But other scholars emphasize that left parties have credibility problems in 
government,4 and do less bad with markets when they have constraints on them, such as 
International Monetary Fund programs5 or domestic institutional barriers to change.6 The 
                                                
1 Geithner 2014. 
2 Markoff and Montecinos 1993, 42. 
3 Chwieroth 2007. 
4 Bernhard and LeBlang 2006; Brooks, Cunha, and Mosley 2015. 
5 Cho 2014. 
6 Sattler 2013. 
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Geithner anecdote could be representative of left-leaning presidents appointing 
economists to improve their credibility with markets. 
When economists become policy-makers remains poorly understood.7 Early work 
on ministerial selection is largely descriptive.8 Blondel finds that “specialists” 
(appointments corresponding to prior training) are less frequent than “amateurs,” except 
in economic portfolios.9 This work does not explain cross-national patterns and trends, 
and it excludes recent decades. Later studies find that competitive elections increase 
politician “quality,” for instance in terms of educational background.10 However, the 
selection of finance ministers and central bankers is rarely studied, despite their crucial 
importance for fiscal and monetary policy.11  
If differences in economics background did not have policy implications, they 
may be best left for political biographies. Yet a growing literature associates the 
                                                
7 Besley (2005, 44) claims that political economists have been “positively hostile” to the 
topic of political selection. In contrast, research on firms’ financial performance closely 
examines the personal characteristics of decision-makers (Kaplan et al. 2012; 
Malmendier et al. 2011). 
8 E.g., Dogan 1989. 
9 Blondel 1985; Blondel 1991. 
10 Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011; Galasso and Nannicini 2011; Hirano and Snyder 
2014. 
11 Rogoff 1985; Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen 2009. Exceptions include Chwieroth 
(2007, 2010) and Adolph (2013). 
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characteristics of leaders with economic growth,12 public spending,13 budget deficits,14 
and market liberalization.15 The characteristics of cabinet ministers may affect social 
welfare and labor market policy.16 The professional backgrounds of central bankers are 
linked to inflation.17 German state finance ministers with previous financial sector 
experience have had more success in cutting deficits.18 Chwieroth contends that, in 
emerging market economies, “neoliberal” finance ministers and central bankers, 
identified by where they studied economics, are more likely to liberalize capital accounts 
and to cut social spending.19 In addition, experimental work shows that individual 
behavioral traits, specifically levels of “patience” and “strategic skills,” affect trade 
policy choices.20 Yet, none of these studies explain why some types of economic policy-
makers are selected in the first place. Perhaps the best work to combine a selection model 
with one on policy is the book-length treatment by Adolph, but it is limited to central 
bankers and to their career backgrounds.21 
                                                
12 Jones and Olken 2005. 
13 Brender and Drazen 2009. 
14 Hayo and Neumeier 2014. 
15 Dreher, Lamla, Lein, and Somogyi 2009. 
16 Alexiadou 2016. 
17 Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Adolph 2013. 
18 Joachimsen and Thomasius 2014. 
19 Chwieroth 2007, 2010. 
20 Hafner-Burton, LeVeck, Victor, and Fowler 2014. 
21 Adolph 2013. 
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This focus on individuals should be seen in a broader context of studies that 
examine partisanship and policy. Early debates22 from the 1970s concerned the tradeoff 
captured in a Phillips curve between low inflation and growth, with right parties favoring 
the former and left parties the latter, but subsequent research on partisan cycles is 
mixed.23 Some recent work considers whether partisanship affects the likelihood of 
crises, with one piece on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries suggesting that right governments are associated with the development 
of financial crises while left governments have to deal with their consequences.24 Myopic 
voters then move right-ward as the consequences are longer lasting and voters blame the 
left.25 Yet much of this literature assumes a monolithic “left” or “right.” What is missing 
is the actor set. 
We contribute the first comprehensive analysis of when economists become top-
level “economic policy-makers,” focusing on financial crises and the ideological position 
of a country’s leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational 
background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 
40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic 
policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are 
                                                
22 Hibbs 1977. 
23 Clark 2003. 
24 Broz 2013. 
25 Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch 2016. Lindvall (2014) argues that the electoral 
benefits for right-wing parties after deep economic crises are present but last only a few 
years. 
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less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central 
bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a 
financial services background. A leader’s exposure to economics training is also related 
to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is 
through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers. We speculate about 
future uses of the dataset to explore partisan economic cycles. 
 
Financial Crises, Partisanship, and Appointments 
A first question to consider is why leaders do not always appoint economists to economic 
policy roles. The work cited above and what we provide below indicate that the modal 
choice for finance minister is not an economist. Economists are more frequent as central 
bank governors, but even there one finds variation — the first Bank of England governor 
to hold a PhD in economics was Mark Carney, who was appointed only in 2013. Blondel 
argued that “specialists” as ministers have substantial authority on a given topic both 
among cabinet colleagues and among civil servants.26 At the same time, as our Geithner 
anecdote suggests, they often lack the more “political” skills within a party and with 
voters more generally. If one presumes that leaders need first and foremost to get re-
elected and that there are fewer agency losses in a principal-agent relationship when a 
“generalist” is more sensitive to the political pressures facing the leader, all else equal the 
leader would prefer a more political minister to a more technocratic one. Under what 
conditions would the leader’s appointment preferences be reversed? 
                                                
26 Blondel 1991, 3. 
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 One possibility concerns financial crises. In addition to worries about voters, 
governments also need to pay attention to investors, who can provide capital to get out of 
the crisis. If markets balk at a government’s rescue plan, it cannot borrow money when it 
needs funds quickly. The nature of the voter reaction to a financial crisis should also 
matter. Someone bears the costs of a financial crisis, and negotiating politically viable 
policies to address such a crisis is difficult. No private actor can buy out the financial 
sector, and it falls to the government to propose solutions and to execute decisions. Such 
crises impose different types of financial costs on government.27 These costs tend to be 
largest in the advanced economies we examine. 
 Having an economist in charge of economic policy during a financial crisis may 
help the government gain credibility with both markets and voters and outweigh any 
expected agency losses. First, there may be greater confidence that the policy-maker 
knows the field and understands the problem. This knowledge can be crucial when a 
policy mistake can prolong a financial crisis.28 Crises also focus attention on policy. 
Mosley finds that investment fund managers normally pay little attention to government 
policies in developed countries.29 When there is a risk of sovereign default, however, they 
pay close attention. Domínguez cites the need to signal commitment to pro-market 
                                                
27 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 3-4) report median costs of financial crises prior to 2007 
amounting to a loss of output of 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), an increase 
in public debt of 16 percent of GDP, and direct costs of supporting the financial sector of 
10 percent of GDP. 
28 Ahamed 2009. 
29 Mosley 2003. 
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policies to investors as a reason for the emergence of “technopols” in Latin America — 
technically skilled politicians, mainly economists.30 Voters, on the other hand, care more 
about economic performance when a country falls well behind the performance of other 
countries.31 When this is not the case, they consider a wider variety of policy issues.  
 A second reason relates to distributive politics. The politics of adjustment is about 
pushing the costs of reform onto political opponents.32 The appointment of an economist 
may convey that traditional politics are at least suspended until the country exits the 
financial crisis, with “efficiency concerns” trumping “redistributive ambitions.”33 This 
may be because experts have different career concerns due to incentives to demonstrate 
technical competence to their peers, in our case academic and professional economists, 
not (just) to win the next election.34 
 Both arguments suggest that economists are more likely to become economic 
policy-makers during financial crises than non-crisis periods. We examine whether 
banking (or financial) crises increase demand for economic policy-makers with advanced 
economics training and who understand the financial industry. But demand could vary 
across different professional backgrounds: individuals seen as too closely associated with 
the troubled financial sector, such as former private bankers, are unlikely to inspire 
                                                
30 Domínguez 1997, 25-35. 
31 Kayser and Peress 2012. 
32 Alesina and Drazen 1991. 
33 Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006, 628. 
34 Alesina and Tabellini 2007. 
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confidence during banking crises and may well be less likely to become policy-makers at 
such times. Our data allow us to examine this nuance. 
 
H1: Financial crises increase the likelihood that an economist is appointed as economic 
policy-maker. 
 
H2: Financial crises decrease the likelihood that an economist with a professional 
background in the finance industry is appointed as economic policy-maker. 
 
 Next, consider how partisanship relates to potential agency losses for a leader. A 
crude way of thinking about partisanship is that left governments represent labor power 
while right ones represent capital.35 If governments were simple mirrors of their 
constituencies, the left would have a union official as a finance minister while the right 
would have a banker. However, another important constituency is markets. Most 
governments must gain credibility with capital markets to finance the state and to 
reassure investors.36 In the period we consider, “markets” means “world markets.” To 
signal economic competence to distrusting markets, who indeed fear that the economic 
policy-makers are simply direct copies of their leaders, left governments should be more 
likely to appoint economists.37 This may be especially so during financial crises, when 
governments must borrow money from investors to get out of a crisis. 
                                                
35 Hibbs 1977. 
36 Sattler 2013. 
37 E.g., Anderson 2011. 
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H3: Leaders from a left party are more likely to appoint economists as economic policy-
makers. 
 
H4: Financial crises amplify the likelihood that leaders from a left party appoint 
economists as economic policy-makers. 
 
For central bank appointments, Adolph argues that the demand for relevant occupational 
backgrounds will vary in more subtle ways with government ideology. He predicts that 
left parties appoint central bankers with “dovish” occupational backgrounds, such as 
work in government or in the central bank, while right parties appoint people with 
“hawkish” backgrounds, such as individuals who previously worked in the finance 
ministry or in private finance.38 This again fits the argument that leaders try to minimize 
agency losses in their economic policy-maker appointments. Our data allow us to explore 
this relationship with a different sample, and we extend the analysis to finance ministers. 
 
H5: Leaders from a left party are less likely to appoint economists with a professional 
background in the finance industry as economic policy-makers. 
 
                                                
38 Adolph (2013) finds “dovish” central bankers are associated with higher inflation, 
while Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) find former central bank staff are associated with 
lower inflation than former politicians. 
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H6: Leaders from a left party are more likely to appoint economists with a professional 
background in the central bank as economic policy-makers. 
 
Before we proceed, a caveat: It is not a priori clear that being an economist in 
itself is a desirable trait for an economic policy-maker, and this is not our argument. A 
good manager with little economic competence may do as well, or better, than an 
economics PhD; a more politically inclined economic policy-maker may have more 
success in selling and implementing a given policy than an economics professor. 
Moreover, ministries and central banks have many staff who shape policy decisions.39 
We leave these aspects to follow-up research. 
 
Variables and Data 
We collected data on the educational and professional backgrounds of finance ministers 
and central bank governors. As we later examine whether economists as heads of 
government are less likely to appoint other economists, and for comparison, we also 
include leaders. The dataset covers all 27 European Union (EU) members as of 2010 and 
13 non-EU members of the OECD. It spans the years 1973 to 2010, but we only include 
democratic periods as indicated by a positive Polity score.40 This yields data on 427 
leaders, 537 finance ministers, and 212 central bank chiefs. 
                                                
39 Page and Jenkins 2005. 
40 More demanding cut-offs reduced the sample only slightly and made no difference. 
Periods when a country did not exist or was not independent are also excluded. 
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 We use two measures of academic training in economics. The first indicates an 
advanced (graduate) education in economics, in the form of either a masters or doctoral 
degree, or both. This coding is preferable to a simple indicator for a masters degree due to 
differences in tertiary education systems. For instance, many US students enter PhD 
programs directly from undergraduate study, whereas the first qualification awarded in 
some other countries is equivalent to a masters degree. Our second measure indicates a 
doctorate or PhD in economics.41 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 Figure 1 compares cross-country education patterns. In the average country, 
leaders had an advanced degree (PhD) in economics 22 percent (12 percent) of the time. 
For finance ministers, the equivalent figures are 42 and 23 percent. Ten out of the 40 
countries never had a finance minister with an economics PhD during the sample period. 
At the other extreme are Chile and Mexico as well as EU accession countries Poland, 
Hungary, and Slovenia. Moreover, three southern European countries at the center of the 
Eurozone crisis — Greece, Portugal, and Spain — had better trained finance ministers 
than most of their peers. In each case, more than half of the time finance ministers had an 
advanced degree in economics and about 45 percent of the time at the doctoral level. 
When looking at central bankers, perhaps the surprise is that there are nine countries 
                                                
41 For comparison, Figure 1 also shows the share of policy-makers that studied economics 
at any level, including undergraduate, but we do not consider the latter a strong signal of 
economics training. 
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where no governor had a PhD in economics, but governors of the average country had an 
advanced degree (PhD) in economics about two-thirds (one-third) of the time. Across the 
three categories, central bankers have the highest level of economics training, followed 
by finance ministers and then leaders. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 We also collected information on the professional trajectory of each economic 
policy-maker prior to assuming the office. We use these data to construct three measures 
of experience as a professional economist. They capture whether an office holder 
previously worked as an economics professor, in a central bank, or in financial services (a 
commercial bank or the wider financial industry). Career backgrounds can cover multiple 
occupations, so these indicators are not mutually exclusive, and unlike our education 
variables they are not clearly correlated. 
 Figure 2 summarizes the share of policy-makers with a given occupational 
background by country. We observe an association between prior careers and the 
likelihood that economics skills are important for a particular position. Compared with 
prime ministers and finance ministers, there are substantially more central bank 
governors with prior experience in central banking or financial services. Given that 
central bankers tend to have the highest levels of educational attainment across the three 
categories, it is also not surprising that academic economists are more prominent. 
However, as with educational background, the range of country averages is substantial, 
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and these figures do not reveal when policy-makers are most likely to have these 
characteristics. 
Our independent variables refer as precisely as possible to the time when an 
individual took office. We obtain indicators of banking crises from Laeven and 
Valencia.42 Our measure of the “leftness” of a leader’s party is based on Benoit and 
Laver’s 20-point left-right dimension score, standardized to a theoretical range from zero 
(extreme right) to one (left).43 We discuss alternative definitions and data sources as part 
of our robustness checks. The data appendix provides full details. 
 
Specification and Results 
We estimate a baseline linear probability model in which the probability that an 
economist becomes an economic policy-maker p in country c at time t is a function of our 
crisis and partisanship variables. We include country fixed effects to absorb time-
invariant determinants and decade effects account for the changing nature of academic 
training in particular — doctoral degrees were less common in the past: 
 
Economistpct = b1Leftct + b2Crisisct + Countryc + Decaded + epct 
 
The results in panel A of Table 1 show that a leader from an extreme left party is 
about 19 percentage points more likely to appoint finance ministers with a PhD in 
economics (column 2), and 28 percentage points less likely to appoint someone with a 
                                                
42 Laeven and Valencia 2012. 
43 Benoit and Laver 2006. 
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finance industry background (column 5), than a leader from an extreme right party. Left 
leaders are also 22 percentage points more likely to appoint former central bank staff to 
the finance portfolio. During financial crises, individuals with a private finance 
background are 10 percentage points less likely to be appointed (column 5). In contrast, 
the results for central bankers in Panel B of Table 1 reveal few patterns. Left leaders are 
more likely to appoint central bank heads with an advanced economics degree (column 
1). This coefficient is substantively large but imprecisely measured. Sample size in these 
regressions is small, as central bankers on average last longer in their jobs than finance 
ministers. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
As our dependent variables are binary, we repeated the analysis using conditional 
(fixed effects) logistic regressions. Reassuringly, this yields an identical pattern of results 
(see online appendix, Table A1). One drawback is that conditional logistic regressions are 
costly in terms of observations when variation in outcomes is rare and concentrated 
among some units. Moreover, the coefficients are less intuitive to interpret. Hence we 
prefer linear probability models, which are also standard in related work.44 
 Next, we introduce a range of different specifications to examine the robustness 
of our findings. The full results appear in the online appendix. The first concerns the 
measurement of financial crises. Reinhart and Rogoff’s definition is broader and yields 
more appointments during a banking crisis, about 18 percent of finance ministers and 21 
                                                
44 Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011. 
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percent of central bank heads in our sample versus about 12 percent for both categories 
with Laeven and Valencia’s data.45 However, Reinhart and Rogoff cover fewer countries 
(32 versus 38). For finance ministers, we get the same pattern of results, while crisis-time 
appointments to head the central bank are now more likely to have a PhD in economics 
(Table A2). Second, our results do not change with a wider crisis measure that also 
includes currency and debt crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (Table A3). 
We then augment our model with an interaction to allow the effect of partisanship 
to vary across crisis and non-crisis periods: 
 
Economistpct = b1Leftct + b2Crisisct + b3(Leftct ´ Crisisct) + Countryc + Decaded + epct 
 
The coefficient on the interaction term is never significant at conventional levels 
— the appointment decisions of left leaders during financial crises cannot be 
distinguished from those in non-crisis periods (Table A4). For central bank heads, the 
joint effect of left partisanship in a crisis is significant at the 10 percent level in the first 
education regression, showing that left leaders are likely to appoint a central bank head 
with an advanced economics degree during a financial crisis. 
We also consider the possible effects of a battery of additional control variables. 
Markets and voters may care more about having an economist in place when debt levels 
are high, so we account for debt as a percentage of GDP.46 Central bank independence 
might increase the likelihood that an economist is appointed as central bank governor. 
                                                
45 Reinhart and Rogoff 2009. 
46 Abbas et al. 2010. 
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Moreover, it may be correlated with unobserved variables and affect finance minister 
appointments as well. We use Cukierman’s47 measure of central bank independence as 
updated by Bodea and Hicks.48 Coalition government may constrain appointments, with a 
party leader lacking an economics background more likely to become finance minister, 
and it makes delegation of monetary policy more likely.49 We include a dummy variable 
for coalition government.50 Where political constraints increase policy stability, 
governments may not need to signal to markets their commitment to market-friendly 
policies because policy changes are unlikely.51 We use the Henisz measure for political 
constraints.52 Places with weak bureaucracies may compensate with economists at the 
top, so we include a measure for bureaucratic quality from the International Country Risk 
Guide. Finally, countries with higher capital mobility might be where capital favours 
technocratic governments. While decade dummy variables already capture common 
changes over time, we add the Chinn-Ito measure for capital account openness.53 
In the finance minister regressions, our core findings are stronger with these 
controls included (Table A5). In the central banker regressions, crisis and partisanship are 
now never statistically significant (Table A6). Interestingly, neither is central bank 
                                                
47 Cukierman 1992. 
48 Bodea and Hicks 2015. 
49 E.g., Bernhard 2002. 
50 Beck et al. 2001. 
51 Sattler 2013. 
52 Henisz 2002. 
53 Chinn and Ito 2006. 
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independence, but political constraints reduce the likelihood that a governor was an 
economics professor or had prior experience in central banking.54 
We further explored the context in which leaders are most likely to appoint 
economists. First, we restricted our sample to the advanced industrialized democracies of 
OECD members prior to 1993 excluding Turkey. The main results on whether a finance 
minister has a finance background hold, but none of the education results go through 
(Table A7). This is consistent with an interpretation that left leaders in emerging markets 
are more likely to appoint formally trained economists, to assure investors of their 
commitment to market-friendly policies. Next, using the full sample and an augmented 
interactive model, we find no evidence that left leaders are under increased pressure to 
appoint economists the higher the stock of public debt (Table A8) or the lower the 
government’s political constraints (Table A9). 
 We conclude our analysis with an extension. Our dataset allows us to explore 
whether the perceived need for appointing an economist may be less when other senior 
policy-makers already have such credentials. We augment the main model with our 
measure of advanced economics training for the leader and for the remaining economic 
policy-maker (Table A10). Leaders with advanced economics training are more likely to 
                                                
54 While the substantive results are robust, there are some interesting patterns concerning 
the additional variables. An increase in capital account liberalization makes a finance 
minister with a PhD in economics less likely, counter to our expectations. An increase in 
bureaucratic quality makes it less (more) likely that a central banker has an advanced 
economics degree (financial services background), though we caution that there is no 
significant effect on whether the governor has the highest degree, or a PhD in economics. 
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appoint finance ministers with a central banking or private finance background, by 8 and 
9 percentage points respectively, but the academic training of the central bank head plays 
no role. When appointing finance ministers, leaders with economics training may reward 
relevant practical experience. Next, consider monetary policy-makers. Central bank 
governors are respectively 24 and 17 percentage points less likely to have an advanced 
economics degree or PhD when they are appointed by leaders with an advanced 
economics education. They are also 31 percentage points less likely to have a private 
finance background when the finance minister has advanced economics training. These 
results strongly suggest that appointment decisions are not made in isolation, and reflect 
economics expertise across senior government roles. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
In the introduction, we used the appointment of Timothy Geithner as Treasury Secretary 
as an example of an economist becoming an economic policy-maker. It was one 
observation, however, and there were different possible explanations for his appointment. 
Based on our analysis, the appointment as “finance minister” of a central banker who had 
studied economics at the postgraduate level was more likely because the president came 
from a party of the left.55 The example illustrates a wider pattern of increased demand for 
                                                
55 Republican President Donald Trump’s appointment in 2017 of Treasury Secretary 
Steven Mnuchin, a former Goldman Sachs banker and hedge fund manager, also fits our 
prediction that a leader from the right is more likely to appoint a finance minister from 
the finance industry. 
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economists where markets and populations may be nervous about whether those in power 
are able to manage the economy. 
 More specifically, while we do not find that financial crises make the appointment 
of economists more likely (H1), those with a background in private finance are less likely 
to be appointed at such times (H2). We document increased demand for economists when 
leaders from left parties are in power (H3), but at best weak evidence that this is 
amplified during financial crises (H4). However, left leaders avoid appointing finance 
ministers with professional experience in the financial industry (H5), and prefer those 
with a central banking background (H6). Adolph documents a similar pattern for central 
bankers, but we find it only for finance ministers. This could be because Adolph 
considers an earlier period, 1945 to 1998, during which central bank appointments were 
perhaps more politicized.56 
A growing literature considers the effects of the type of policy-makers without 
paying attention to their selection. We demonstrate that partisanship systemically affects 
the initial selection of those policy-makers. Our results should encourage more thought 
about the causal mechanisms that may undergird “partisan” political business cycles in 
some fields, or perhaps why they do not appear in some studies. Clark and Arel-Bundock 
find that decisions by a politically “independent” Federal Reserve Bank favour 
Republican presidents over Democratic ones.57 Their evidence suggests that their model 
performs better than Abrams and Iossifov’s, who examine the partisanship of the 
                                                
56 Adolph 2013. His sample also contains fewer countries. 
57 Clark and Arel-Bundock 2013. 
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president who appoints the Fed Chairman.58 One reason may be that central bankers want 
to be in the finance industry after their central bank careers and are captured by the 
industry. While our results on central banker appointments are weak, we do find that left 
leaders are much less likely to appoint people with financial industry backgrounds to the 
finance ministry and prefer former central bankers instead. This suggests that the loop 
between the financial industry and prominent government jobs has a partisan hue to it, 
and that it is more common under right governments. 
A limitation of our study is that we look exclusively at the primary economic 
policy-makers. There are other cabinet members who may influence policy, as Alexiadou 
shows for employment and social welfare policy.59 Concerns about agency losses may be 
on the mind of leaders more when markets do not demand a certain type of policy-maker 
in a portfolio. While our extension shows that leaders do not make appointment decisions 
in isolation, further work should encompass the backgrounds of the wider set of cabinet 
ministers in a way compatible with our framework. 
                                                
58 Abrams and Iossifov 2006. 
59 Alexiadou 2016. 
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Figure 1: Economics Training by Category of Policy-Maker and Country 
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Note: The data appendix provides variable definitions and sources. Democratic years are defined as those 
with a positive Polity score. Years prior to the independence or creation of a country are excluded. 
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Figure 2: Occupational Background by Category of Policy-Maker and Country 
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Figure A2: Occupational Background by Category of Policy-Maker and Country 
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Table A1: Economists as Policy-Makers, Conditional Logits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis -0.422 -0.106 0.150 0.572 -0.969** 
 (0.414) (0.439) (0.502) (0.367) (0.472) 
Left 0.353 1.556** 0.999 2.547** -2.892** 
 (0.617) (0.696) (0.864) (1.174) (1.157) 
Observations 388 287 250 249 295 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis 1.227 0.622 0.824 0.464 -0.694 
 (0.911) (0.705) (0.854) (0.817) (0.687) 
Left 3.476** -0.850 1.910 2.293 -0.367 
 (1.684) (1.440) (1.535) (1.551) (1.298) 
Observations 125 117 100 118 118 
Notes: The estimates are from conditional (fixed effects) logit models with decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors 
clustered by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
  
 5 
Table A2: Economists as Policy-Makers, Banking Crisis Data from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis (RR) -0.075 -0.004 -0.065 0.040 -0.105** 
 (0.060) (0.044) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047) 
Left 0.059 0.169* 0.147 0.214* -0.258** 
 (0.131) (0.095) (0.101) (0.112) (0.121) 
R-squared 0.330 0.364 0.327 0.167 0.165 
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis (RR) 0.124 0.230* 0.016 -0.050 0.038 
 (0.100) (0.118) (0.128) (0.162) (0.112) 
Left 0.335 -0.319 0.168 0.482 0.031 
 (0.332) (0.297) (0.297) (0.429) (0.399) 
R-squared 0.438 0.400 0.370 0.299 0.283 
Observations 134 134 133 133 133 
Notes: The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors clustered 
by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A3: Economists as Policy-Makers, Broader Crisis Measure from Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis (Broad) -0.042 0.021 0.023 0.049 -0.108** 
 (0.057) (0.049) (0.054) (0.041) (0.045) 
Left 0.077 0.184** 0.106 0.212** -0.272** 
 (0.118) (0.087) (0.102) (0.094) (0.112) 
R-squared 0.336 0.352 0.317 0.161 0.183 
Observations 433 433 432 432 432 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis (Broad) 0.152 0.009 0.003 -0.026 -0.023 
 (0.134) (0.157) (0.130) (0.152) (0.137) 
Left 0.520* -0.201 0.175 0.485 -0.093 
 (0.296) (0.298) (0.240) (0.352) (0.324) 
R-squared 0.434 0.372 0.385 0.336 0.280 
Observations 156 156 155 155 155 
Notes: The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors clustered 
by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A4: Economists as Policy-Makers, Interactions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis 0.042 0.193 -0.016 0.034 -0.056 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.078) (0.097) (0.117) 
Left 0.112 0.259*** 0.095 0.209** -0.265** 
 (0.116) (0.083) (0.101) (0.096) (0.107) 
Left × Crisis -0.279 -0.509 0.088 0.060 -0.119 
 (0.367) (0.330) (0.168) (0.251) (0.215) 
Left | Crisis = 1 -0.166 -0.250 0.184 0.269 -0.384 
 (0.351) (0.324) (0.185) (0.250) (0.235) 
R-squared 0.338 0.358 0.317 0.161 0.181 
Observations 433 433 432 432 432 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis -0.165 0.183 0.065 0.040 -0.560* 
 (0.407) (0.354) (0.344) (0.320) (0.303) 
Left 0.429 -0.195 0.172 0.455 -0.219 
 (0.335) (0.337) (0.278) (0.354) (0.332) 
Left × Crisis 0.703 -0.125 -0.025 0.106 0.929 
 (0.757) (0.680) (0.601) (0.821) (0.687) 
Left | Crisis = 1 1.132* -0.320 0.148 0.561 0.710 
 (0.653) (0.576) (0.519) (.814) (0.633) 
R-squared 0.440 0.377 0.387 0.339 0.297 
Observations 156 156 155 155 155 
Notes: The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors clustered 
by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A5: Economists as Finance Ministers, Expanded Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
Crisis -0.123 0.034 0.040 0.114 -0.151*** 
 (0.096) (0.075) (0.064) (0.076) (0.044) 
Left 0.058 0.306** 0.233* 0.240** -0.341*** 
 (0.177) (0.118) (0.135) (0.092) (0.110) 
Debt 0.000 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Central Bank Independence 0.390 0.358** 0.333 0.062 0.070 
 (0.247) (0.172) (0.202) (0.149) (0.143) 
Coalition Government 0.062 0.099* 0.016 0.065 -0.024 
 (0.065) (0.051) (0.051) (0.047) (0.066) 
Political Constraints -0.432 -0.083 0.418 -0.696** -0.291 
 (0.351) (0.474) (0.349) (0.302) (0.299) 
Bureaucratic Quality -0.161 -0.023 0.001 -0.020 -0.062 
 (0.140) (0.063) (0.053) (0.076) (0.081) 
Capital Account Openness -0.221 -0.238** -0.131 -0.166 -0.060 
 (0.163) (0.106) (0.132) (0.116) (0.105) 
R-squared 0.420 0.456 0.381 0.214 0.260 
Observations 335 335 336 336 336 
Notes: Finance ministers only. The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard 
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A6: Economists as Central Bankers, Expanded Controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
Crisis -0.034 0.164 -0.119 0.089 0.006 
 (0.189) (0.159) (0.149) (0.229) (0.124) 
Left 0.300 -0.277 0.236 0.741 0.121 
 (0.330) (0.351) (0.271) (0.470) (0.462) 
Debt 0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Central Bank Independence -0.163 -0.392 0.091 0.203 0.138 
 (0.502) (0.428) (0.511) (0.465) (0.446) 
Coalition Government -0.102 -0.175 -0.088 -0.010 0.082 
 (0.142) (0.116) (0.146) (0.188) (0.175) 
Political Constraints -0.568 -1.399 -2.194** -2.592*** 1.322 
 (0.994) (1.054) (0.884) (0.675) (1.164) 
Bureaucratic Quality -0.435** 0.093 0.057 0.163 0.461** 
 (0.211) (0.219) (0.195) (0.231) (0.180) 
Capital Account Openness -0.120 -0.429 -0.532 -0.556 0.327 
 (0.332) (0.430) (0.319) (0.363) (0.407) 
R-squared 0.566 0.534 0.428 0.442 0.411 
Observations 115 115 114 114 114 
Notes: Central bank heads only. The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard 
errors clustered by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A7: Economists as Policy-Makers, Reduced Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis -0.005 -0.023 -0.042 -0.016 -0.113*** 
 (0.106) (0.082) (0.044) (0.056) (0.037) 
Left 0.147 0.130 0.110 0.235 -0.262** 
 (0.160) (0.125) (0.126) (0.146) (0.112) 
R-squared 0.232 0.242 0.241 0.182 0.183 
Observations 288 288 288 288 288 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis 0.149 0.135 -0.011 0.095 0.054 
 (0.214) (0.228) (0.151) (0.276) (0.187) 
Left 0.290 -0.300 0.193 0.336 -0.030 
 (0.358) (0.348) (0.309) (0.440) (0.423) 
R-squared 0.446 0.434 0.438 0.277 0.271 
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 
Notes: The sample contains policy-makers from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors 
clustered by country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A8: Economists as Policy-Makers, Left Interacted with Debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis -0.076 0.017 0.034 0.065 -0.095** 
 (0.071) (0.059) (0.061) (0.042) (0.042) 
Left 0.191 0.428** 0.201 0.122 -0.444** 
 (0.202) (0.158) (0.222) (0.170) (0.188) 
Left × Debt -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Debt 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.344 0.377 0.327 0.170 0.207 
Observations 413 413 413 413 413 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis 0.064 0.083 0.066 0.085 -0.073 
 (0.163) (0.176) (0.145) (0.152) (0.130) 
Left 0.155 -0.980** 0.086 0.301 -0.870 
 (0.636) (0.475) (0.413) (0.612) (0.603) 
Left × Debt 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.004 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) 
Debt 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
R-squared 0.457 0.403 0.396 0.368 0.300 
Observations 145 145 144 144 144 
Notes: The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A9: Economists as Policy-Makers, Left Interacted with Political Constraints 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Crisis -0.063 -0.002 0.023 0.052 -0.098** 
 (0.063) (0.052) (0.052) (0.043) (0.047) 
Left 0.179 -0.351 0.071 1.039 0.149 
 (0.727) (0.631) (0.679) (0.814) (0.399) 
Left × Political Constraints -0.288 1.201 0.108 -1.798 -0.867 
 (1.569) (1.413) (1.464) (1.648) (0.824) 
Political Constraints -0.219 -0.488 -0.067 0.239 0.319 
 (0.551) (0.461) (0.567) (0.740) (0.389) 
R-squared 0.338 0.352 0.312 0.183 0.186 
Observations 431 431 430 430 430 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Crisis 0.159 0.124 0.064 0.087 -0.136 
 (0.159) (0.172) (0.149) (0.164) (0.138) 
Left 0.874 0.227 -0.199 0.600 0.290 
 (1.048) (1.176) (0.939) (1.447) (1.372) 
Left × Political Constraints -0.843 -1.096 0.655 -0.274 -0.816 
 (2.193) (2.369) (2.261) (3.407) (3.330) 
Political Constraints -0.180 -0.461 -1.180 0.129 0.767 
 (0.766) (1.039) (0.898) (1.203) (1.107) 
R-squared 0.441 0.395 0.422 0.334 0.290 
Observations 155 155 154 154 154 
Notes: The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors clustered by 
country are in parentheses.   *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Table A10: Economics Training and the Appointment of Other Economists 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Adv Econ Degree Econ PhD Econ Professor Central Banking Financial Services 
A. Finance Minister      
Advanced Econ Degree (Leader)  -0.031 -0.018 0.025 0.084* 0.090** 
 (0.076) (0.055) (0.063) (0.044) (0.042) 
Advanced Econ Degree (Head of Central Bank) 0.027 0.017 0.089 0.007 0.010 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.060) (0.049) (0.040) 
Crisis -0.088 -0.018 0.029 0.047 -0.110** 
 (0.065) (0.050) (0.049) (0.037) (0.054) 
Left 0.061 0.180* 0.142 0.194** -0.295*** 
 (0.110) (0.090) (0.099) (0.093) (0.102) 
R-squared 0.345 0.357 0.330 0.173 0.198 
Observations 425 425 425 425 425 
      
B. Head of Central Bank      
Advanced Econ Degree (Leader) -0.235** -0.173** -0.114 0.044 0.042 
 (0.095) (0.073) (0.074) (0.094) (0.169) 
Advanced Econ Degree (Finance Minister) 0.052 -0.117 -0.116 -0.115 -0.311* 
 (0.120) (0.126) (0.122) (0.146) (0.156) 
Crisis 0.141 0.153 0.082 0.121 -0.045 
 (0.158) (0.153) (0.137) (0.177) (0.141) 
Left 0.534* -0.218 0.170 0.467 -0.088 
 (0.276) (0.304) (0.232) (0.337) (0.312) 
R-squared 0.461 0.399 0.401 0.345 0.333 
Observations 156 156 155 155 155 
Notes: The estimates are from linear probability models with country and decade fixed effects (not reported). Standard errors clustered by country are in 





We present below information about our dataset. The first part of the table defines the independent variables of interest, the second 
covers our education measures, and the third our occupation measures. 
 
Two research assistants separately coded each policy-maker. As much as possible, they used official sources to collect the information. 
The sources used include parliamentary archives; finance ministry and central bank websites; websites of international institutions 
including the European Parliament, European Commission, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Club 
of Rome, European Investment Bank, and the United Nations; biographical encyclopedias, including Munzinger, Britannica, and 
national biographical databases; personal websites of politicians; and newspaper reports. Where no information was available, we 
wrote to the respective institution and asked for assistance. This was necessary especially for policy-makers from the 1970s. 
 
Our educational background coding is based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Where an undergraduate degree combined two disciplines, we counted 
it as an economics education when it included the subject as a major. Degrees combining more than two disciplines including some 
economics — such as the “Politics, Philosophy and Economics” program at Oxford — are not coded as an economics qualification, 
since the minimum requirements for studying the subject are in our view too light. We also considered a wider definition of 




Name in Paper Name in Dataset Description Coding Source 
     
A. Independent Variables     
Crisis lvbankingall Dummy variable for whether a country is in a 
banking crisis or not. Where available, this is dated 
monthly, otherwise yearly. 
0 = no banking crisis; 1 = 
banking crisis. 
Laeven and Valencia (2012). The monthly 
information is from the "Additional Data" 
tab of their dataset. 
Left rlpartypm_s Codes how far left or right the political party of the 
prime minister or president is, overall, as determined 
by the Benoit-Laver expert survey in 2002. The 
original data are coded as follows: 1 = Left to 20 = 
Right. 55 = Independent; 88 = Transition/Caretaker 
government; 99 = unknown political party. 
We standardise the scores 
to a theoretical range from 
0 = right to 1 = left, with 
original scores above 20 
coded as missing. 
Benoit and Laver (2006). 
Crisis (RR) rrbankingcrisis Dummy variable for whether a country is in a 
banking crisis or not. 
0 = no banking crisis; 1 = 
banking crisis. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), dataset 
updated to 2010, 
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/brows
e-by-topic/topics/7/ 
Crisis (Broad) lvanycrisis Dummy variable for whether a country is in a 
banking, currency, and/or debt crisis or not. This 
measure uses annual information only. 
0 = no crisis; 1 = any crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2012). 
Debt imfpublicdebtgdp Gross general government debt in percent of GDP. 
Where not available, especially for the period before 
1980, central government data are reported. 
Debt scaled to nominal 
GDP. 
Abbas et al. (2010); 2011 version of the 
dataset. 
Central Bank Independence CBIweighted Weighted version of the Cukierman index of central 
bank independence. 
Ranges from 0 = not 
independent to 1 = full 
independence. 
Bodea and Hicks (2015), based on 
Cukierman (1992). 
Coalition Government coalition Dummy variable for coalition government, calculated 
from the govfrac variable in the World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions. 
0 = single-party 
government; 1 = coalition 
government. 
Beck et al. (2001); 2012 version of the 
dataset. 
Political Constraints polconiii Political Constraint Index (POLCON). Ranges from 0 = no 
constraints to a maximum 
of .72 in our dataset. 
Henisz (2002); 2017 version of the dataset. 
Bureaucratic Quality bureauquality Bureaucratic Quality measure from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database, including data 
for years prior to 1984. For France in 1976, we 
corrected the score to 4 (from 4.2). 
Ranges from 0 = lowest to 
4 = highest quality. 
Data downloaded from the ICRG database 
in 2012 for Hallerberg and Scartascini 
(2015) and updated with data from Bayer 
and Urpelainen (2016). 
Capital Account Openness ka_open Capital account openness, known as the Chinn-Ito 
Index, standardized to run between 0 and 1. 
Ranges from 0 = closed to 1 
= open. 
Based on Chinn and Ito (2006); 2016 
version of the dataset. 
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B. Education Variables     
Any Economics Degree econdegreepm/fm/cb Dummy variable for whether the leader/finance 
minister/central bank governor has any degree in 
economics, including the undergraduate, masters, or 
doctoral level; undergraduate degrees with two 
subjects one of which is economics are coded as 
economics undergraduate degrees. 
0 = no degree; 1 = degree. See introductory note. 
Advanced Economics Degree econdegreepm2/fm2/cb2 Dummy variable for whether the leader/finance 
minister/central bank governor has an advanced 
(graduate) degree in economics, including masters 
and/or PhD. 
0 = no degree; 1 = degree. See introductory note. 
Economics Doctorate or PhD econphdpm/fm/cb Dummy variable for whether the leader/finance 
minister/central bank governor has a doctoral degree 
or PhD in economics. 
0 = no PhD; 1 = PhD. See introductory note. 
     
C. Occupation Variables     
Economics Professor econprofpm2/fm2/cb2 Dummy variable for whether the leader/finance 
minister/central bank governor’s professional 
experiences prior to occupying the office include 
working as an academic economist in a university or 
a research institute. 
0 = not an academic 
economist; 1 = academic 
economist. 
See introductory note. 
Central Banking centralbankerpm2/fm2/cb2 Dummy variable for whether the leader/finance 
minister/central bank governor’s professional 
experiences prior to occupying the office include 
working in a country's central bank. 
0 = no central banking 
background; 1 = central 
banking background. 
See introductory note. 
Financial Services privatefinancepm/fm/cb Dummy variable for whether the leader/finance 
minister/central bank governor’s professional 
experiences prior to occupying the office include 
working in a commercial bank or the financial 
services industry more widely. We combine these 
since some countries have universal banks. 
0 = no financial services 
background; 1 = financial 
services background. 
See introductory note. 
 
